I'm an associate professor at the University of Colorado Boulder.  I just finished a book arguing against standard conceptions of epistemic norms.  That motivates my current work, about how non-evidential considerations do or do not give reasons for belief.  We can learn that believing p would be good in some way - morally, prudentially, aesthetically - without this giving us any evidence that p is true.  But it is typically difficult or impossible for these non-evidential considerations to directly impact what we believe. What questions does this raise?  If belief is not able to respond to these important non-evidential considerations, is belief just a terrible burden?  Many think that these non-evidential considerations are not reasons to believe but at best reasons to get ourselves to believe.  When reasons to believe conflict with reasons to get ourselves to believe, what are the normative implications?  Finally, non-evidential considerations favoring belief do play some reason-like functions; is that sufficient to make them reasons to believe, even when they can't motivate belief directly?