My research focuses historically on the philosophy of German Idealism, especially the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel, systematically on the philosophy of action, metaethics and legal philosophy. I have written a book on moral and legal responsibility in Hegel's philosophy. The action-theoretical foundations of responsibility play a central role therein. Since then, I have become increasingly interested in fundamental questions of practical normativity and their connection to us as agents.

As a ‘Human Abilities’ fellow, I will be working on an essay on the phenomenon of omitting and its relevance for the debate on reactive attitudes. The initial thesis is that our ability to act also includes the ability to refrain from acting, i.e. the ability to omit. And certain phenomena of omitting are central to understanding what characterizes our reactive attitudes. In particular, objective attitudes, which are often understood in contrast to reactive attitudes, are inconceivable without a focus on the ability to omit. The aim is to show that, contrary to Strawson’s main thesis, it is precisely the objective attitudes and the ability to omit that are the key to freedom of the will. This project, even though strictly systematic, is informed and influenced by my research on the philosophies of Fichte and Hegel.