My research focuses on ethics and moral psychology in the early modern period. I am especially interested in the perfectionist tradition, a family of views that understands the good life in terms of the exercise or development of distinctively human capacities—reason above all. I received my Ph.D. from UC San Diego in 2023, with a dissertation on Spinoza’s Theory of Value. At the Human Abilities Centre, I examine the idea that agency fundamentally involves the capacity to detect and conform our actions to reasons—what sometimes goes under the name of reasons-responsiveness. I am especially interested in the metaphysical requirements of this capacity, and what it might take for human beings to meet these requirements. Within the context of early modern philosophy, I am developing a reading of Spinoza on which reasons (and our capacity to respond to them) must be understood in terms of value properties that we project onto things based on our desires. While it remains a form of value antirealism, such a projectivist reading promises to preserve many of the structural roles that reasons-responsiveness plays in various normative domains, like the prudential good, or well-being, and moral responsibility.